UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007)
In their joint report of 22 June 2007, the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the UN Secretary-General proposed a wide-ranging mandate for a hybrid AU-UN mission for Darfur in an effort to overcome GoS objections to a purely UN force supplanting AMIS. Through Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007, the UN endorsed the proposed mandate as written in the joint report thereby establishing UNAMID and entrusting it with eight over-arching objectives:
(a) To contribute to the restoration of necessary security conditions for the safe provision of humanitarian assistance and to facilitate full humanitarian access throughout Darfur;
(b) To contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians, within its capability and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan (authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter);
(c) To monitor, observe compliance with and verify the implementation of various ceasefire agreements signed since 2004, as well as assist with the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements;
(d) To assist the political process in order to ensure that it is inclusive, and to support the African Union-United Nations joint mediation in its efforts to broaden and deepen commitment to the peace process;
(e) To contribute to a secure environment for economic reconstruction and development, as well as the sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes;
(f) To contribute to the promotion of respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Darfur;
(g) To assist in the promotion of the rule of law in Darfur, including through support for strengthening an independent judiciary and the prison system, and assistance in the development and consolidation of the legal framework, in consultation with relevant Sudanese authorities;
(h) To monitor and report on the security situation at the Sudan's borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.
The Security Council also endorsed the joint report's recommendation that the new hybrid mission should be given specific tasks in four areas as a way to increase the mission's effectiveness and chances for success. The following are examples from each of the four areas:
(a) Support for the peace process and good offices:
(i) To support the good offices of the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur and the mediation efforts of the Special
(ii) To support and monitor the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and subsequent agreements;
(iii) To facilitate the preparation and conduct of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, as stipulated in the Darfur Peace Agreement.
(i) To promote the re-establishment of confidence, deter violence and assist in monitoring and verifying the implementation of the redeployment and disengagement provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement, including by actively providing security and robust patrolling of redeployment and buffer zones, by monitoring the withdrawal of long-range weapons, and by deploying hybrid police, including formed police units, in areas where internally displaced persons are concentrated, in the demilitarized and buffer zones, along key routes of migration and in other vital areas, including as provided for in the Darfur Peace Agreement (authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter);
(ii) To monitor, investigate, report and assist the parties in resolving violations of the Darfur Peace Agreement and subsequent complementary agreements through the Ceasefire Commission and the Joint Commission;
(iii) To monitor, verify and promote efforts to disarm the Janjaweed and other militias;
(iv) In the areas of deployment of its forces and within its capabilities, to protect the hybrid operation's personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations-African Union personnel, humanitarian workers and Assessment and Evaluation Commission personnel, to prevent disruption of the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement by armed groups and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks and threats against civilians;
(c) Rule of law, governance, and human rights:
(i) To assist all stakeholders and local government authorities, in particular in their efforts to transfer resources in an equitable manner from the federal Government to the Darfur states, and to implement reconstruction plans and existing and subsequent agreements on land use and compensation issues;
(ii) To assist in promoting the rule of law, including through institution-building, and strengthening local capacities to combat impunity;
(iii) To ensure an adequate human rights and gender presence capacity, and expertise in Darfur in order to contribute to efforts to protect and promote human rights in Darfur, with particular attention to vulnerable groups;
(iv) To assist in harnessing the capacity of women to participate in the peace process, including through political representation, economic empowerment and protection from gender-based violence;
(d) Humanitarian assistance:
(i) To facilitate the effective provision of humanitarian assistance and full access to people in need.
Assessment of UNAMID mandate
As Refugees International (RI) noted, the passage of Resolution 1769 may be a decisive step towards protecting the vulnerable people of Darfur, but its language is deliberately vague on the force's actual mandate to do so. RI sees the main reason for this vagueness in the nature of multilateral decision-making in the Security Council, which is based on the need for consensus-building, and concludes that 'the sovereignty of a state that has failed dismally to protect its own population has trumped international morality.'
Regardless of the potential shortcomings of Resolution 1769, the real issue is whether or not UNAMID's Force Commander, Lieutenant General Patrick Nyamvumba, and the Troop Contributing Countries are willing to risk the lives of their soldiers and police officers in order to prevent or stop killing and to end the gross abuses of human rights in Darfur. In this vein, it is worth noting that by October 2009, 48 UNAMID staff members had been killed, some in deliberate attacks, yet patrols and the deployment continue.
In his analysis of various options available to UNAMID's force commander, Alex de Waal recommended avoiding what he called 'garrison peacekeeping' (i.e. treating Darfur as a hostile territory in which UN troops are continually under threat, and mount patrols only in a state of combat readiness with full armour). Instead, he suggested that UNAMID should use a 'community peacekeeping' approach, i.e. treating Darfur's communities as allies in a concerted attempt to stabilize the region. As he explains, this would entail posting a community liaison officer in every single chief's court or town market, with the aim of gaining the confidence of the community leaders, finding out what are their problems, assisting in solving those problems, and identifying any looming clashes so that pre-emptive action can be taken. Based on recent UN reports, it appears that UNAMID is using some of these tactics in its daily operations.
For an updated assessment of UNAMID's performance, see UNAMID Issues.
In light of the complexities of the conflict, the (ever-changing) number of parties to the conflict, the reluctant cooperation from GoS, the untried and untested hybrid mission structure, the presence of UNMIS in the same country, the world's largest humanitarian effort in the same theatre and critical trans-border issues that come under the purview of UNAMID and a different mission on the Chad and CAR sides of the borders, effective command and coordination mechanisms will be central elements to UNAMID's eventual success.
Intra-UNAMID: The AU and UN agreed in November 2006 that any hybrid mission would be led by a 'Joint Special Representative' (JSR) of the AU Chairperson and the UN Secretary-General (SG). The JSR is appointed by, and reports to, the Chairperson and the SG. The JSR is entrusted with overall authority for the mission, its management and implementing its mandate.
The Force Commander (FC), the Police Commissioner (PC) and their respective deputies are appointed by the AU Chairperson in consultation with the SG. Both the Commander and the Commissioner report to the JSR. Operational orders are transmitted through an integrated mission headquarters that includes coordinating units such as the Joint Operations Centre and the Joint Logistics Operating Centre.
AU-UN Coordination: The two organisations will provide coordinated support to UNAMID through the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) based in Addis Ababa. The JSCM is staffed by a dedicated team of liaison officers tasked to backstop UNAMID with operational and planning support.
Inter-UNAMID and other missions: Although UNAMID is a distinct mission, it will maintain close ties with both UNMIS and the AU Liaison Office for the implementation of the CPA with the view to ensuring that the implementation processes of the DPA and the CPA proceed in mutually-reinforcing ways and to ensure continued logistical support from the UN.
Coordination and communications with the DSRSG/RC/HC of UNMIS will be particularly important as the humanitarian effort in Darfur will remain under the purview of the DSRSG/RC/HC of UNMIS and will not be part of UNAMID. UNAMID will not have any direct responsibility for the work of the UN and non-UN relief agencies working in Darfur save for the above-mentioned mandated task to 'facilitate the effective provision of humanitarian assistance and full access to people in need.'
UNAMID will coordinate closely with the AU and UN Joint Chief Mediator for Darfur as he pursues the political process that will hopefully end the Darfur conflict. Standing liaison arrangements will be established and maintained within the Joint Mediation Support Team that already works in the service of the Joint Chief Mediator.
UNAMID has been tasked to establish 'civilian-military liaison offices' in both of the newly expanding mission in Chad and CAR (MINURCAT) but, at the time of writing, it is not clear what progress has been made. Of course, given the importance of cross-border issues for UNAMID, these offices must be established on an urgent basis and function effectively.
Inter-UNAMID and the Parties: In the first instance, UNAMID will interact with the parties through its monitoring, verifying and reporting role for the Ceasefire Commission and the Joint Commission, which have been in place since the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement that was signed in April 2004.
Outside of this forum, the JSR will work with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the rebel leadership.
At the operational level, UNAMID will engage through a number of thematic or operational issues. For example, the police component will represent UNAMID on the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission as a means to encouraging police reform. Also, the Tripartite Committee on Deployment issues has been meeting since 7 October 2008 to bring together GNU, the AU and UN to discuss and solve UNAMID deployment problems, challenges and concerns.
UNAMID will coordinate with Darfurian civil society groups through the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, plus institutions created through the DPA, such as the Transitional Darfur Service Commission.
Challenges: Coordination between UNAMID and the parties, as is always the case, will be as effective as the parties want it to be. While UNAMID will have limited influence over the attitudes of the parties, it will still need to ensure that it is properly organised internally so that it is an effective and motivated interlocutor for the parties through all points and mechanisms of contact and coordination.
Of more specific concern will be the establishment and maintenance of the mechanisms intended to increase coordination between the AU and UN, and between UNAMID and other missions, such as UNMIS and MINURCAT. As noted above, the arrangements have been mandated and established, in some cases, but, it is not clear how effective they will be in promoting joint or coordinated action. At this point in UNAMID's deployment, there is reason to think that these various mechanisms will remain nothing more than information-sharing arrangements, not platforms for joint or coordinated decision-making.
Military: The largest component of UNAMID will be the military component with its authorised force strength of 19,555. As of 31 October 2009, the military component had reached 14,803 personnel, plus 207 military observers.
Police: The Police Component is authorised to reach a maximum number of 6,432 police officers. As of 31 October 2009, the number was at 4,280.
Non-uniformed components represent the balance of the mission structure and personnel levels. As of 28 February 2009, there were 1,053 non-uniformed international and 2,357 national civilian staff members in UNAMID. This number will rise as the mission continues to deploy, with the authorised limit at 5,569.
The non-uniformed civilian staff will fill the following components:
Following the signing of the 5 June 2004 Declaration in which the GoS and the SPLM/A confirmed their agreement to the six protocols and reconfirmed their commitment to completing the remaining peace negotiations, the Security Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, established byof 11 June 2004 a special political mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS). UNAMIS was mandated to facilitate contacts with the parties concerned and to prepare for the introduction of an envisaged peace support operation. As set forth in SCR 1547, the mandate for UNAMIS was three-fold:
The Secretary-General appointed Jan Pronk as his Special Representative (SRSG) for the Sudan and head of UNAMIS, two Deputy Special Representatives (DSRSGs) and a Military Adviser. This team was supported by a number of international personnel, including military liaison and political and civil affairs staff, public information officers and experts in logistics and administration, as well as in other requisite areas of expertise.
The SRSG also worked along with the UN Country Team in Sudan to develop a unified structure to ensure that the UN was in the best position to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). UNAMIS administration and support elements focused on developing and refining operational plans on the ground, as well as preparing for the deployment of military and civilian personnel and providing effective forward support to the mission.
UNAMIS was transformed into the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on 24 March 2005, with the UN Security Council's adoption ofwhich tasked UNMIS with supporting the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A in the implementation of the CPA.
Following the signing on 9 January 2005 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the GoS and the SPLM/A, UNAMIS was transformed into the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), with the UN Security Council's adoption of resolution 1590 on 24 March 2005, establishing a full-fledged peacekeeping mission for Sudan. Acting on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Council decided that the tasks of UNMIS would be:
With respect to the armed forces of the GoS and SPLA, UNMIS has three fundamental mandates:
UNMIS is also mandated to assist the parties to the CPA in a number of additional ways that are common to integrated missions:
In addition to the essential task of supporting the parties' implementation of the CPA, UNMIS has three important responsibilities, to be fulfilled in coordination with international partners:
Responsibility for Darfur
In resolution 1590, which established UNMIS, the Security Council 'request[ed] that UNMIS closely and continuously liaise and coordinate with all levels with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with a view toward expeditiously reinforcing the effort to foster peace in Darfur.'
Additionally, after setting forth the UNMIS mandate, including with respect to human rights, in resolution 1590 the Security Council also 'underscore[d] the immediate need to rapidly increase the number of human rights monitors in Darfur.' It urged the Secretary-General and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to accelerate such deployment of human rights monitors to Darfur and to move forward with the formation of civilian monitoring protection teams.
Chapter VII Authorization
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council authorized UNMIS 'to take the necessary action in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities to protect UN property and the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers as' well as 'without prejudice to the responsibility of the Sudanese government, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.'
Renewals of the Mandate
The UNMIS mandate has been renewed six times, most recently until 30 April 2009, with the intention to renew it for further periods, as previously. See SCR 1627 (2005) of 23 September 2005; SCR 1663 (2006) of 24 March 2006; SCR 1714 (2006) of 6 October 2006; SCR 1755 (2007) of 30 April 2007; SCR 1784 (2007) of 31 October 2007 and SCR 1812 (2008) of 30 April 2008.
While not changing the mission's mandate, in SCR 1663 (2006) of 24 March 2006, the Security Council referred to the existing UNMIS mandate and urged its attention to both the Darfur and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) crises.
Supporting implementation of the CPA
Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), the principal mandate of UNMIS is 'to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement' through a variety of tasks. As foreseen by the UNAMIS mandate, first among these is to monitor and verify implementation of the ceasefire and to investigate violations.
The Status of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (SOMA)
The SOMA between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations concerning the status of the United Nations Mission In Sudan, can be seen at http://www.unmis.org/english/documents/sofa.pdf
In its early stages of deployment, UNMIS entered into agreements, normally via Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), with the following organizations:
UNMIS also developed a working relationship with AMIS on several fronts (political, civil affairs, human rights, humanitarian) and maintained permanent Military and UN CIVPOL liaison officers with AMIS, both in Addis Ababa and El-Fasher. UNMIS will no doubt develop an even closer one with UNAMID. As a matter of course, UNMIS also conducts inter-mission cooperation with UNMEE and MONUC in a number of areas. For example:
UNMIS - Mission Structure
As set out by the Secretary-General, the UN Mission in the Sudan is headed by his Special Representative and includes components focusing on the following four broad areas of engagement:
Good offices and political support for the peace process are addressed by the Secretary General's Special Representative, as well as political affairs and public information components. The political affairs component supports the Special Representative and the UN operation as a whole through the provision of political advice, reporting, analysis and assessment and secretariat support as required.
Security aspects are addressed by the military component by monitoring and verifying ceasefire agreements, protecting UN personnel and facilities, and ensuring freedom of movement for its personnel. Furthermore, the military protects civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and, within its capability, assists the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, and supports other UN programmes.
As the Mission is dealing with a broad range of issues, the Secretary-General stressed the importance of a joint, integrated strategy among the UN agencies, funds and programmes in order to successfully implement the CPA and achieve the goal of 'supporting the Sudanese people in establishing a peaceful and democratic Sudan where all citizens will live in conditions of greater dignity and security.' Nevertheless, a clear distinction is maintained between the coordinating role of the Mission and the implementation responsibility of agencies, funds and programmes.
As of 31 October 2009, the strength of UNMIS was 10,003 uniformed personnel (including 8,821 military troops, 476 military observers and 715 police), and approximately 3,300 civilians.
UNMIS is a multidimensional, integrated and unified mission comprising numerous and diverse components:
Unified and Joint Structures - UN Country Team (UNCT), Joint Operations Centre, Joint Mission Analysis Centre, Integrated Support Services and a Joint Logistics Operations Centre.
Civil Affairs Section - reporting to the Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs, it consists of a main office in Khartoum and a network of field offices.
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) - As described in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and mandated by SC , UNMIS is "to assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction".
Gender Unit - The Gender Unit was established in March 2005, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1590, which reaffirms SCR 1325, to implement a plan of action to guide the process of gender mainstreaming in all aspects of the work of UNMIS.
Human Rights Office - The mandate of the UNMIS Human Rights Office is derived from the UN Security Council's, which called for ensuring an adequate human rights presence, and expertise within UNMIS to carry out human rights promotion, civilian protection and monitoring activities.
Military Component - A total of 10,000 military personnel have been authorized for deployment as part of UNMIS' multinational peacekeeping force, to assist and support the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Of the 10,000 peacekeepers, there are 750 UN Military Observers (UNMOs), approximately 4,000 in a protection force responsible for protecting UN staff, equipment, and installations as well as helping Sudanese authorities to protect any civilians who come are in imminent danger, and another 4,000 who are involved in administrative and logistical support activities, along with demining and reconstruction work.
Police Component - The UNMIS Police component is tasked with assisting in the development of Sudan's police service, aiming to help create a modern, effective and efficient Sudanese police service which operates fairly and impartially and in observance of the rule of law, with respect for human rights and in accordance with internationally accepted standards of conduct. When fully deployed, the UNMIS Police team will consist of more than 700 police officers and policing experts from a range of UN member states.
Political Affairs Division - The mission of the Political Affairs Division is to provide advice and support on all political matters to the SRSG and his Principal Deputy. The Division is headed by a Director of Political Affairs and has a total strength of 11 Political Affairs Officers and three Administrative Assistants.
Public Information Office - The UNMIS Public Information Office provides information about UNMIS and its activities to all the stakeholders in the Sudanese peace process, including the Sudanese people, from the community to the national level; the two parties to the peace process; the Sudanese media; and the humanitarian community. In addition, the UNMIS Public Information Office provides information to the international media, troop contributing and donor countries, and the Sudanese diaspora.
Rule of Law and Judicial Systems Advisory - The UNMIS Rule of Law and Judicial System Advisory Unit obtains its mandate from UN Security Council Resolution(24 March 2005). The Unit provides legal policy advice to senior UN management and supports the CPA and constitutional process in Sudan. Key tasks include monitoring the Parties' adherence to their rule of law-related commitments in the CPA, Interim National Constitution (INC), the Interim Constitution Southern Sudan (ICSS), and state constitutions and provision of technical assistance where needed; assistance and support to newly-established commissions, including the Commission to Protect the Rights of non-Muslims in the National Capital, the National Judicial Service Commission, the revised Joint National Transition Team and the National Constitutional Review Commission, as well as National, Southern Sudan and local actors. Support to law reform processes will also be a priority. The Corrections Advisory component provides policy expertise to corrections management in Sudan. In the Rule of Law Sector, UNMIS works closely with UNDP and other UN agencies, NGOs, donors and national stakeholders.
United Nations Volunteer (UNV) - United Nations Volunteers is the United Nations focal point for promoting and harnessing volunteerism for effective development. It is a trusted development partner because it respects each country's control over its own future while bringing countries together to work on shared challenges.
Implementation of CPA and deployment of UNMIS
Deployment of UNMIS personnel and resources, as well as progress reports on implementation of the CPA are provided, on an ongoing basis, to the UN Security Council by the Secretary-General.
Ethiopia & Eritrea - UNMEE: In June 2000, after two years of fighting in a border dispute, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a cessation of hostilities agreement following proximity talks led by Algeria and the Organization of African Unity. In July, the Security Council set up UNMEE to maintain liaison with the parties and establish a mechanism for verifying the ceasefire. In September 2000, the Council authorized deployment within UNMEE of up to 4,200 military personnel to monitor the cessation of hostilities and to help ensure the observance of security commitments.
In the course of the implementation of UNMEE's mandate, Eritrean frustration over what it calls the Ethiopian occupation of Eritrean territory around the town of Badme led to increasing tensions between the government and the UN mission. When Eritrea began to cut off fuel and food supplies to UNMEE, the mission had to begin relocating to Ethiopia in February 2008. According to the UN Security Council, Eritrea's obstructions towards the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) had reached a level undermining the basis of the Mission's mandate and had compelled it to temporarily relocate. In early June, the Security Council announced that a decision on the terms of a future engagement in Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as the future of the Mission, would be taken in the light of consultations with the parties.
Democratic Republic of Congo - MONUC: The United Nations Security Council established MONUC to facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka Accord signed in 1999. With a budget exceeding one billion dollars, it is the largest and most expensive mission in the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO). MONUC's mandate can be broken down into four phases: Phase one involved forcibly implementing the ceasefire agreement. Phase two involved its monitoring, and the reporting of any violations through the proper channels. The third phase, still underway, centers on the DDRRR (disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration) process. Phase four, also in progress, includes facilitating the transition towards the organization of credible elections. MONUC is placed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Its mandate authorizes it to use all means deemed necessary, within the limits of its capacities and in the areas of deployment of its armed units, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; and to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions.Chad / CAR - MINURCAT & EUFOR TCHAD/CAR - The deployment of an EU military force to Chad and the Central African Republic, originally scheduled for the end of 2007, was delayed for several months due to complications, including a lack of helicopters. Some analysts have also manifested concerns regarding the force's operational capacity on the ground arguing that the force's multi-dimensional nature and Chapter VII mandate may prove to be too much. Lieutenant General Patrick Nash is the Operation Commander of the new force, which will be comprised of up to 4,300 troops from 20 nations; France is expected to provide half of the personnel.